Abstract: This paper examines the implications of international fragmentation of production for trade patterns of Singapore and the other ASEAN economies, with emphasis on their regional and global economic integration. The analysis reveals that the degree of dependence of these countries on this new global division labour is much larger compared to the other countries East Asia, Europe and North America. Network-related trade in parts and components has certainly strengthened economic interdependence among ASEAN countries and between ASEAN and other major economies in East Asia, but this has not lessoned the dependence of growth dynamism of these countries on the global economy. The operation of cross-border production networks depends inexorably on trade in final goods with North America and the European Union.
Introduction
International fragmentation of production, the splitting of production process into discrete activities which are carried out in different countries, and the resultant cross-border exchange of parts and components ('fragmentation trade') have been an increasingly important facet of economic globalization over the past three decades. It is clearly evident that while growth in fragmentation-based trade is now a global phenomenon, it is far more important for economic growth and structural transformation in countries in Southeast and East Asia than elsewhere in the world. However, the implications of this form of international specialisation for economic transformation in these countries and for their integration into the global economy have not yet been adequately explored. The existing literature on trade patterns in the region is largely based on the traditional notion of horizontal specialisation scenario in which countries trade goods that are produced from start to finish in just one country.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the size and dynamics of fragmentation trade and its implications for regional and global integration of ASEAN member countries.
Two key themes figure prominently in the empirical analysis; the implications of emerging trade patterns of this trade for the debate on regional versus global integration of the countries in the region, and China's evolving role in the process of international fragmentation of production and regional production networks. Our focus on the first theme is based on the premise that, in a context where fragmentation trade is growing rapidly, the conventional approach to trade flow analysis can lead to misleading inferences as to the nature and extent of trade integration among countries and prospect for maintaining growth dynamism through global economic integration. Intra/extra regional patterns of fragmentation trade and trade in related final goods ('final trade') are unlikely to follow the same geographic patterns, and hence trade shares calculated using reported trade data can lead to wrong inferences as to the relative importance of the 'region' and the rest of the world for growth dynamism of a given country/region. Relating to the second theme, we aim to probe the debate on whether the emergence of China as the world's most rapidly growing industrial economy would crowd out other countries' opportunities for integrating into the regional and global economy through fragmentation-based specialization.
In order to assess the magnitude and nature of fragmentation-based trade it is necessary to differentiate between parts and components, and final (assembled) products.
We do this through a careful disaggregation of 5-digit level data from the UN Comtrade database based on the Revision 3 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, Rev 3). The data are for the period from 1993, when almost all countries reporting to the UN trade system had adopted the revised reporting system, to 2004, which is the most recent year for which data are available for all reporting countries. For the purpose of intertemporal comparison calculations are made for the two-year averages relating to the end points (1993-4 and 2003-4) so as to reduce the impact of ear to year fluctuations of trade flows. Given the nature of available data, the prime focus of analysis is on trade in machinery and transport equipment (products belonging to SITC Section 7). So the tabulations presented here of the magnitude of fragmentation-based trade are downward biased. However, the magnitude of the bias is unlikely to be substantial because fragmentation-based international specialisation is predominantly concentrated in this product category. Among the ASEAN member countries, only the six largest economiesIndonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam-are covered; Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are ignored because of lack of data. East Asia is defined to include Japan, and developing East Asia which covers the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) in North Asia (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the evolution of fragmentation-based production networks in ASEAN in order to set the stage for the ensuing analysis. Section 3 examines the nature and extent of fragmentation trade and the role of Pacific Rim countries in this new global division of labour followed by an analysis of the implications of fragmentation-based specialization for the debates on regional versus global integration and the emerging role of China in regional production networks. Section 4 reports the preliminary results of an econometric analysis of the determinant of trade flows of parts and components and the related final goods. The final Section presents the key policy inferences. The procedure followed in extracting data from the UN trade data tapes, data quality, and methodological issues related to estimating the impact of production fragmentation on trade patterns are discussed in Appendix 1.
2.
A Brief History
The location in developing countries of relatively labour intensive component production and assembly within vertically integrated international industries ('international production fragmentation' or 'outsourcing') has been an important feature of the international division of labour since about the mid-1960s. The process was started by electronics MNEs based in the USA in response to increasing pressures of domestic real-wage increases and rising import competition from low cost sources. The US government facilitated the process an outward processing tariff (OPT) scheme under which companies were allowed to export material for processing overseas and to re-import the finished products, paying tariff only on the value added abroad (not the exported intermediates). Geography, costs and history all combined to persuade US MNEs to first explore opportunities for outsourcing in neighbouring countries in Latin America. However, unfavourable investment climate in these countries -macroeconomic instability, political tensions, trade union upheavals and uncertainty led American producers to switch to sub-suppliers located in East Asia (Helleiner 1973 , Grunwald and Flamm 1985 , Feenstra 1998 This strategic move by US MNEs coincided with the embrace by the newlyindependent Singapore of export-oriented industrialization as a deliberate policy to grow away from the traditional staple port economy. This happy coincidence of a significant shift in global production and palpable domestic policy shift, combined with the country's strong locational advantages, a virtually unbroken history as a free port, and other favourable initial conditions, set the stage for a 'electronic revolution' which transformed
Singapore from a labour-surplus to a labour-scarce economy within period of less than a decade (Lee 2000, Chapter 4; Goh 1993; Huff 1994, Chapter 11 As early as 1972 the MNEs with production facilities in Singapore began to relocate some low-end assembly activities in other countries in the region (particularly in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) in response to rapid growth of wages and land prices.. Many newcomer MNEs to the region set up production bases in these countries bypassing Singapore. By the late 1980s this process had created a new regional division of labour, based on skill differences, differences in factor prices, especially labour, and superior communication facilities. At the time there was a widespread concern in policy circles in
Singapore that the regional spread MNE operations in electronics industry could be at the expense of Singapore. However, the subsequent developments have vividly demonstrated that 'the larger the scale and scope of electronic industry [which produces a wide range of heterogenous end-products, each of which needs a large number of equally heterogenous components in its manufacture] in Southeast Asia, the greater the economies of scale and more the opportunities for specialisation for all participating countries' (Goh 1990). More recently, regional production networks have begun to expand to Vietnam (Athukorala 2006a ). 1 Despite obvious advantageous in terms of location and relative wages, Indonesia has so far failed to benefit from this new form of international specialisation because of the unfavourable domestic investment climate (Athukorala 2006b ).
Singapore has continued to remain the regional centre of cross-border production networks as the attraction of the country for international production was continuously enhanced by the policy emphasis of the government on infrastructure development, expanding the human capital base and skill upgrading, maintaining labour relations in a manner highly conducive for international production and sound macroeconomic management. Over the years Singapore's role in regional production networks have gradually shifted from low-skill component assembly and test to component design and fabrication and playing a services role in regional production (McKendrick et al 2000, Brown and Linden 2005) The continued attraction of the region as a location of assembly activities seems to have been underpinned by a number of factors. First, despite rapid growth, manufacturing wages in all ASEAN countries except Singapore still remain lower than or comparable to those in countries in the European periphery and Mexico. Moreover, significant differences in wages among the countries within the East Asia region have provided the basis for rapid expansion of intra-regional product sharing systems, giving rise to increased cross-border trade in parts and components. Second, the relative factor cost advantage has been supplemented by a relatively more favourable trade and investment policy regimes, 1 Until recently, the fledgling electronics industry was largely dominated by small companies from newly industrialized countries in East Asia, with the sole exception of Fujitsu which operated a medium-size assembly plat in Ho Chi Ming City. On 28 February 2006, Intel Corporation, the world's largest semiconductor producer, announced that it will invest $300 million to build a semiconductor testing and assembly plant (with an initial workforce of 1200) in Ho Chi Ming City as part of its worldwide expansion of production capacity. Figure 1 ). It seems that the region has become increasingly specialised in the production of components. As will see below this development has mirrored in a sharp increase in the regions component exports to China. It seems that rapid expansion of China's role in world trade has brought about a notable shift in the patterns of regional division of labour, with ASEAN countries playing an increasing role in producing parts and components for rapidly growing final assembly activities in China. (Table 4) . However, in terms of estimates based on final trade, the share remained virtually unchanged at 51%. While the difference between intra-regional shares of final and total trade is observable for both exports and imports, the magnitude of the difference is much larger on the export side. In 2003-4 only 41% of final goods exported from ASEAN found markets within the East Asian region, compared to 64% of total exports. For ASEAN the relevant figures were 20% and 16%
respectively. Moreover, for all East Asian countries Japan is a much smaller market for final goods exports, accounting for less than 10% in all cases in 2003-4, compared to the USA and the EU. It is also interesting to note that, unlike in the case of East Asia (or developing East Asia and AFTA), the estimated intra-regional trade share for NAFTA, the EU and the other regional groupings are remarkably resilient to the inclusion or exclusion of component trade.
In sum, the estimates presented in this section support our hypothesis that, in a context where fragmentation based trade in expanding rapidly, the standard trade flows analysis can lead to misleading inferences regarding the on-going process of economic integration through trade. When parts and components are excluded from trade flows, our estimates suggest that extra-regional trade is much more important than intra-regional trade for growth dynamism of ASEAN economies. Thus, the ongoing process of product fragmentation seems to have strengthened the case for a global, rather than a regional, approach to trade and investment policymaking.
(b) Production Fragmentation and China's Integration into the Regional Global Economy
The dramatic growth of FDI inflows to China over the past one-and-a-half decades has been accompanied by a sharp decline in the share of almost every other country in the total regional (as well as global) inflows. These contrasting patterns, couple with some anecdotal evidence of foreign firms either relocating to China have led to serious concern in policy circles in countries in the region (particularly in ASEAN countries) that 'competition' from China has begun to erode their prospect for attracting FDI as a pivotal element of their outer-oriented growth strategy.
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The data presented in Table 7 run counter to this pessimistic view.
The shares of Chinese imports of machinery and transport equipment coming from East Asia increased from 53.6% in 1993-4 to 61% in 2003-4 (Table 7) . This increase was dominated by components. The East Asia share of total Chinese imports of components increased from 67.7% to 68.5% between these two years. Component accounted for over 70% of the total increment in Chinese imports from the region over this period. Japan has continued to remain the major regional source country of parts and components for China, but there has been a notable diversification of source country composition.
The most notably development is the rapid growth of the combined share of On the exports side, China's aggregate intra-regional share has declined persistently in both total manufacturing as well as component exports. Overall, China's evolving export patterns exhibit a clear extra-regional bias (the degree of which has increased over the year), in contrast to greater regional integration on the import side. This difference reflects the increasingly important role of China as a final product assembler for advanced-country markets using middle-products procured from the region. For about the mid 1990s, China has maintained a widening net importing position (trade deficit) with the region (Figure 2 ).
The prime source of the widening deficit has been increasing reliance on countries in the masses, is a function of their economic size and the geographic distance between them. We augment this basic by adding a number of explanatory variables informed by the theory of international production fragmentation. Our specification of the gravity model is: 6 In gravity-model analysis of bilateral trade flows, the GDP variables are usually presented in two multiplicative terms, i.e. GDP i *GDP j and PGDP i *PGDP j. This practice has the advantage of avoiding the statistical problems of possible multicollinearity, and heteroscadasticity (resulting from the presence of effects between extremely large countries and extremely small ones) in model estimation. But there is no theoretical justification for constraining change in partner country and reporting country GDP and PGDP to have the same degree of effect on bilateral trade flows, particularly when it comes to trade in components. In this study we, therefore, include reportingand partner-country GDP and PGDP as separate variables. In this we closely follow (Soloaga and Winters 2001) . This variable specification is, in fact, amply supported my our estimation results ( The results for the distance variable (DST) provide strong support for the hypothesis that cost of transportation and other distance-related costs are an important determinant of trade flows. Interestingly, the distance coefficient for components are larger in magnitude compared to those relating to final trade. 11 This difference is consistent with the hypothesis that vertical specialisation, given the multiple border crossing involved in the production process, is much more sensitive to transport cost. The common language dummy (LNG) is not statistically significant.
The two infrastructure variables (TELP and ELET) were dropped from the final estimates because they were found to be highly correlated with PGDP.
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It seems that there is no need for additional variable for capturing infrastructure quality as it is close correlated with the stage of development as measured by PGDP.
The coefficient on RTA dummy achieves statistical significance in both equations with the expected (positive) sign; supporting the hypothesis the RTAs promote vertical specialisation among member countries. The coefficient on the dummy variable for AFTA is highly significant with the positive sign in both equations. The coefficient in the component trade equation suggests that intra-AFTA is about thirty times higher than the level predicted by the other explanatory variables in the model.
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The unique results for AFTA clearly point to the need for going beyond intraregional tariff reductions (and other variables captured in our model) to understand that region's unique dynamic role in fragmentation trade. Perhaps the explanation lies in economic history, the early choice of the region (firstly Singapore and subsequently
Malaysia and other countries) by MNEs as a location of outsourcing activities. It is well
known that there is a general tendency for MNE affiliates to become increasingly embedded in host countries the longer they are present there and the more conducive the overall investment climate of the host country becomes over time. They may respond sluggishly to relative cost changes once they have invested substantial resources in domestic production facilities and in establishing information links. Moreover, site selection decisions of MNEs operating in assembly activities are strongly influenced by the presence of other key market players in the given country (Rangan and Lawrence 1999).
Moreover, rapid economic expansion for over three decades in a number of countries in the region has presumably brought about 'market thickness' (the economic depth of trading nations) which positively impact on the location of outsourcing activity.
Concluding Remarks
There is clear evidence that the fragmentation-based specialisation has become an integral part of the economic landscape of ASEAN and in the wider East Asian region. Trade in components has been expanding more rapidly than conventional final-good trade. The degree of dependence on this new form of international specialisation is proportionately larger in East Asia, in particular in ASEAN, compared to North America and Europe. A notable recent development in international fragmentation of production in the region has been the rapid integration of China into the regional production networks. This development is an important counterpoint to the popular belief that China's global integration would crowd out other countries' opportunities for international specialization.
China's imports of components from countries in ASEAN and other East Asia countries have grown rapidly, in line with rapid expansion of manufacturing exports mostly to North America and the European Union.
Production fragmentation has certainly played a pivotal role in continuing dynamism of the East Asian economies and increasing intra-regional economic interdependence. This does not, however, mean that the process has contributed to lessoning the regions dependence on the global economy. The high intra-regional trade shares reported in recent studies largely reflect rapidly expanding intra-regional trade in components. There is no evidence of rapid intra-regional trade integration in terms of final products. In fact, the region's growth dynamism based on vertical specialisation depends inexorably on its extra-regional trade in final good, and this dependence has in fact increased over the years. Put simply, growing trade in components has made the East Asia region increasingly dependent on extra-regional trade for its growth dynamism. In this context, these countries would be better off by upholding universal principles of economic openness.
Finally, what are the implications of these findings for the contemporary policy debate on regional economic corporation? In particular, is the new-found fondness in countries in the region for free trade agreements (FTAs) consistent with the objective of maximising gains from the ongoing process of international product fragmentation?
Relating to these issues, our findings do not lend support to the case recently put forward by Baldwin (2006) for a 'New East Asia Regional management Effort' with a reinforced ASEAN+3, with a view to ensuring smooth functioning of the process of fragmentationbased specialisation (which he bubs 'Factory Asia'). Baldwin has correctly identified the importance of fragmentation-based specialisation for economic growth in these countries, but unfortunately he has completely overlooked the important fact that the growth dynamism based on this new form of specialisation depends inexorably on extra-regional trade in final good, and this dependence has in fact increased over the years. Thus, in terms of benefiting from the new opportunities for trade expansion through the fragmentationbased division of labour, the ideal (first best) policy choice appears to be multilateral liberalisation through the WTO process; the ongoing process of product fragmentation seems to have strengthened the case for a global, rather than a regional, approach to trade and investment policymaking.
Appendix 2: Data Source and Method of Data Compilation
There are two approaches to quantifying the magnitude and patterns of manufacturing trade that can be directly attributed to production fragmentation. The first approach, which was commonly used by early studies in this area, is to use the records maintained by OECD countries (in particular the US and countries in the European Union) in connection with the use of special tariff provisions that provide for preferential access for the re-entry of domestically produced components assembled abroad ('outward processing trade (OPT) statistics'). While undoubtedly they provide insights into outsourcing, there are of little use for the present study. The OPT schemes have covered only a selected list of products and the coverage varied among countries and within countries over time. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the importance of these tariff concessions as a factor in promoting global sourcing (and therefore the actual utilization of these schemes), has significantly been diminished over the years by the process of investment and trade liberalisation in ICs and regional economic integration agreements. The second approach is to delineate trade in parts and component from the related final (assembled) goods using
individual-country trade statistics recorded on the basis of the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) of the United Nations.
In its original form (SITC, Rev 1), the UN trade data reporting system did not provide for separating parts and components from final manufactured goods. The SITC Revision 2 introduced in the late 1970s (and implemented by most countries only in the early 1980s) adopted a more detailed commodity classification, which provided for separation of parts and components within the machinery and transport sector (SITC 7).
There were, however, considerable overlap between some advanced-stage assembly activities and related final goods within the sector in the Revision 2, which made it difficult to separate fragmentation trade from total trade (Ng and Yeats 2001). For instance 'television tubes' were not separable from 'TVc' and ' computer processors' were lumped together with 'computers'. Revision 3 introduced in the mid-1980s marked a significant improvement over Revision 2.
It is important to note that, despite its significant improvement over the previous Singapore). Also, some countries fail to properly report goods shipped from their own export processing zones. These exports are simply lump these exports into one highly aggregated category of 'special transactions' under SITC 9. While no fully satisfactory solutions exist for these problems, it is generally believed that data compiled from importer records are less susceptible to recording errors and reveal the origins and composition of trade more accurately since there normally are important legal penalties for incorrectly specifying this information on customs declarations. Among the countries covered in this study, Taiwan is not covered in the UN data system and Vietnam has not yet begun to make data available according to the standard UN format. Singapore was not reporting data on its bilateral trade with Indonesia because of political reasons. 14 In these cases, the data gaps were filled using the corresponding trading partner records.
The data are tabulated using importer records, which are considered to more appropriate compared to the corresponding exporter records for analysing trade patterns for a number of reasons (Ng and Yeats 2003 , Appendix 1, Feenstra et al 1999 .
Importer records are admittedly less susceptible to double counting and erroneous identification of the source/destination country in the presence of entrepot trade compared to data based on reporting country records (eg. China's trade through Hong Kong and Indonesia's through Singapore). Also, some countries fail to properly report goods shipped from their own export processing zones. These exports are simply lump these exports into one highly aggregated category of 'special transactions' under SITC 9. While no fully satisfactory solutions exist for these problems, it is generally believed that data compiled from importer records are less susceptible to recording errors and reveal the origins and composition of trade more accurately since there normally are important legal penalties for incorrectly specifying this information on customs declarations. Among the countries covered in this study, Taiwan is not covered in the UN data system and Vietnam has not yet begun to make data available according to the standard UN format. Singapore was not reporting data on its bilateral trade with Indonesia because of political reasons. 1 In these cases, the data gaps were filled using the corresponding trading partner records. Notes: The data relate to non-oil merchandise exports (total merchandise exports menus all products belonging the SITC 3). Manufactures cover all products belonging to SITC 5 -8 less SITC 68 (non-ferrous metals). Primary products derived as total non-oil merchandise export minus are manufacture. … Zero or negligible. Source: Compiled from Comtrade database. 
Appendix 2 Definition of Variables and Data Source Used in Regression Analysis

Note:
The standard errors (SEs) of the regression coefficients have been derived using the Huber-While consistent variance-covariance ('sandwich') estimator. Statistical significant (based on the standard t-test) is denoted as ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
Country groups/Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) Covered in the Gravity Model : 
